message on a purple bookmark for Washington State prisoners S ixty years ago, Michael Oakeshott could write in his essay "The Idea of a University" that the university had "not yet sunk so low" as to have made it necessary for it "to advertise itself as pursuing a particular purpose"-as if addressing "people so ignorant that they had to be spoken to in baby-language." 2 Our own times no longer warrant such composure. Prison university programs, in particular, must rationalize their activities to students, prison administrators, legislators, and potential donors: a motley crowd with many who may neither understand nor support liberal learning generally and many who may well be suspicious of anything radical. As a student and Teaching Assistant in University Beyond Bars, the college program at the Washington State Reformatory, I have been asked to defend the value of the program before such audiences. On these occasions, I have somewhat mischievously resorted to the authority of Allan Bloom (that bête noire of what is sometimes called the cultural Left and, more importantly, of many of my teachers) for the idea that the purpose of college is to force students to ask themselves, "What is wrong with me? What is so missing or damaged in my humanity, so broken or absent in my soul, so deficient or corrupt in my upbringing and schooling, that four years of study and the massive social mobilization involved in university education should be required to repair and reform it?" I have taken this tack not purely out of mischief, but because Bloom's theory of college conflates education with reformation, something rather helpful to students stuck in a reformatory. Indeed, Bloom's approach to education actually has more in common with critical pedagogy than it does with the pedagogy of those, such as Stanley Fish, who argue that college and university teaching should comprise nothing but the transmission of bodies An "Impossible Profession"? The Radical University in Prison By Atif Rafay of knowledge and traditions of inquiry, along with the analytical skills that makes independent research in those traditions possible.
3 Bloom regards the modern university as, in essence, a powerful and successful Enlightenment conspiracy to preserve the life of the mind by bringing about the total reconstitution of "political and intellectual life under the supervision of philosophy and science."
4 Thus, he shares with radical teachers of the Left both a sense of responsibility for the direction of students' inner lives and the conviction that the university is a vital source of political and social subversion. Such an exacting, exalted understanding of higher education's significance is antithetical to the now flourishing debasement of college into worker training, 5 but it can accommodate a range of other possibilities: the transformation of universities into "democratic centers of humanistic social change committed to combating and to eradicating racism, sexism, imperialism and social injustice," 6 for instance as well as the older ideal of Bildung as the formation of the self and the attainment of humanity through culture.
The difficulties attending such ambitions for education might well be thought formidable enough whether students are imprisoned or not. Plato's Republic, perhaps the first attempt to describe the educational transformation of minds and characters so as to commit them to a radical utopian state, is at the same time the first intimation of the impossibility of the project 7 in the contemporary university. Given that the liberal arts curriculum remains the primary locus for the transformative work that radical education promises, it is fortunate that it has the statistical vitality prized nowadays: it leads, that is, to measurably superior student learning. 8 Just as important for those advocating university programs in prison, it appears to be superior at reducing crime. Even obdurate prison administrators who insist on "evidence-based" (i.e., econometric) proofs of success find the case compelling: one, who emphasizes that her point is "not to advocate liberal arts over vocational training," concedes nevertheless that the "programs with the best track records as measured by reductions in recidivism in scientifically designed follow-up studies are those that, on the surface, sound the least vocational and the most humanistic." She goes on, however, to note that such courses of study "are also the least likely to have shown up on inmate interest inventories." 9 This discrepancy is no mere wry coincidence, but rather a telling symptom. In their disregard for the humanities, many prisoners are in disturbing accord with a prison regime that, evidence notwithstanding, pays for vocational training but not for the liberal arts and sciences. That concordance evinces the profound challenge that confronts higher education in prison, but it also suggests the radical potential that such education possesses. It should remind teachers that, however much their ultimate project may be the transformation of society, their immediate work is with their students. Mark Edmundson argues in the context of teaching undergraduates at the University of Virginia that "professors talk a lot about subversion, which generally means subverting the views of people who never hear us talk or read our work. But to subvert the views of our students, our customers, that would be something else again." 10 Challenging students is no less critical, or difficult, in prison. As Oakeshott insists, the university is "a manner of human activity." 11 The task of inducting students into it involves not the conveyance of information but a crucial modification of sensibility. Whatever radical teachers may hope for from history, from their students they must expect an approach towards what Foucault describes in "What is Enlightenment?" as critical ontologysomething that "has to be considered not, certainly, as a theory, a doctrine, nor even as a permanent body of knowledge that is accumulating," but rather "conceived as an attitude, an ethos, a philosophical life in which the critique of what we are is at one and the same time the historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them." 12 As the etymology of radical implies, radical teaching that deserves the name must reach towards the very root of students who pursue learning: in prison, it should strive to liberate the curiosity that not only imprisonment, but schooling itself, may tend to destroy rather than to nurture.
Such an aim differs radically from the purpose that Chief Justice Burger, writing for a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court, recognized when he wrote, "Providing public schools ranks at the very apex of the functions of a State." 13 Indeed, if anything can trouble the easy equation that teachers understandably tend to make between education and the function of state schooling, prison ought to do so. Between the Enlightenment hypothesis of prison education as the most powerful transformational machine for the undisciplined and a contemporary advertisement that solicits participation in prison education through an appeal (in slang, no less) to the expediency and vanity of the prisoners lies a history in which the prison and the school remain in congenial apposition. Put simply, state schools have, in common with the prison, a disciplinary function; sentimental glamour aside, education is important to the state primarily as discipline. Not for nothing did Dostoevsky have his Underground Man refer to time in school as "penal servitude." 14 Unlike imprisonment, however, education cannot be imposed by unilateral compulsion. Inside the most powerful disciplinary machine, education still requires compliance from prisoners, even if it be compliance coerced by threat or inducement. A Matt Groening "Life in Hell" cartoon captures the archetypal scene, with a battered, irate rabbit, gagged and bound to a chair in the center of a blank room. Off to the side, projecting from behind an almost closed door, a sock puppet blandishes the rabbit: "I may only be a sock puppet, but I think you'd better cooperate with the authorities." Teachers in such tableaux may be forgiven for feeling that their mere presence is subversive. They, after all, do not share the malign intent of the system and do not participate in its violence. They are benevolent ministers of opportunity, and even those radical teachers who are most reflective about their role are unlikely to identify with sock puppets. Even if many prisoners attend classes only to avoid punishment or to obtain employment credentials, or as a desperate attempt to prove themselves worthy of clemency, even if others are there merely for a pastime or for some contact with the free world, and even if the levels of academic accomplishment that most attain and the credentials they receive are mediocre, some may nonetheless learn something and perhaps even come to value learning. Regardless, exposure to teaching is surely an intrinsic good and certainly superior to whatever else is on offer in prison. Faute de mieux, real ballas have educations.
So facile a satisfaction in the minimally palliative can hardly be radical. Yet doing more for students inside penal institutions engineered to damage their lives is a daunting task. Today, when community college access is all that remains of higher education in many prisons and when many higher education programs, including my own, must rely on the voluntarism of professors and private fundraising to survive, misgivings about their quality and significance may seem a luxury. They are not. Efforts to improve access to education in prison ought to be seen in the context of a larger historical development: nominal expansion in higher education for the disadvantaged accompanied by increasing hierarchical differentiation among educational institutions in status, quality, and curricula, with the disadvantaged receiving increasingly vocationalized lower-status educations. Paul Fussell puts the much-touted jump in "college attendance," from 13% in 1940 to 43% in 1970, in mordant perspective: "It was still about 13 percent, the other 30 percent attending things merely denominated colleges." Students attending such institutions left "unredeemed, and not merely intellectually. artistically, and socially, but economically as well." 15 Whatever the changes it wrought in higher education, such expansion neither reduced economic inequality nor resulted in significantly greater equality of opportunity. Ann L. Mullen concludes in Degrees of Inequality that, far from being subversive, expanding higher education "palliates the problem of class conflict" by promoting the notion that opportunity prevails and denying the reality of acute, worsening inequality. 16 Indeed, what Fussell calls "the college swindle" actually underwrites the sometimes heartfelt but invariably fatuous belief that more education is the panacea for social ills.
Concern for the quality and significance of higher education in prison is especially urgent for programs impelled by the idealism of a transformative theory of education that seeks to make learning a means for radical social and political change. In so grim a context, the starting premise that education in prison is not inherently radical might well be regarded the politely optimistic subaltern of a bleaker proposition, carefully avoided: the proposition that education in prison cannot be radical. Nevertheless, in her exploration of higher education programs in prison as "a terrain of critical and tactical struggle," Gillian Harkins insists that we "should not yield our claim upon the college and university system as a domain of public institutions for intellectual expansion and educational justice." 17 The question teachers confront is how their radical impulse ought to translate into educational theory and praxis in prison. To the extent that there are options, what choices, if any, should it entail in curricula, admissions policies, pedagogical practices, or the governance of programs?
After all, learning to think radically requires no particular theory or institution, much less a radical one: J. S. Mill got homeschooled and traditional institutions educated Marx, Freud, and Nietzsche, as well as Simone Weil, Foucault, and Derrida. The profusion of such examples may prompt the conclusion that it is strict "conservative" education that really conduces, in good dialectical fashion, to radical thinking. But it will be enough to remark-moderately-that there is meager reason to suppose that achieving desirable intellectual outcomes requires pedagogical practices that exhibit radical political commitments.
Meanwhile, the grim machinery of the carceral regime prepares a starring role, in its very special involuntary parody of higher education, for teachers who privilege such commitments over learning. In what follows, I describe both the implicit education that incarceration imposes and the General Education Development (GED) curriculum that the state mandates, before offering a critical account of undergraduate education in prison. It will be only fair, however, to set out, in addition to the customary caveat about the dangers of generalizations, three of my many prejudices.
First, like most prisoners, I am wary of the conclusion that having nothing is better than having something less than ideal: that would prefer a kind of purity over the real interests of the living prisoners themselves, who are not better off without the programs. Second, as this may suggest, I am sympathetic (and not just grateful) to educators who regard as subversive in itself their provision of education to those ordinarily excluded from it. I doubt they would claim, except perhaps for strategic rhetorical purposes, that their work fulfills the dream of genuine educational or social justice. But they might credibly maintain that helping form, in Antonio Gramsci's formula, "a person capable of thinking, studying, and ruling-or controlling those who rule" is plausibly radical. 18 Last, I am convinced that teachers should reject the project of devising a radical theory of education specifically for prisoners. The prisoner does not constitute an Aristotelian natural kind, and a separate set of educational outcomes inevitably perpetuates the marginalization of imprisoned students. As Raymond L. Jones and Peter d'Errico conclude in their essay, "The Paradox of Higher Education in Prison," rejecting that project may be "the most important curricular decision a prison education program can make." 19 Earl Shorris, whose Clemente Course in the Humanities achieved improbable success teaching gravely disadvantaged adults, quotes Robert Maynard Hutchins to justify his curriculum: "The best education for the best is the best education for all." 20 Efforts to tailor curricula to make it "relevant" surrender at the very outset the autonomy that frees universities to be dedicated to the pursuit of knowledge, interested in their students as potential participants in that enterprise; this autonomy is what enables students to imagine themselves as more than creatures of circumstance. The margin of freedom thus afforded students is never anything but fragile, tenuous, and even to a great extent wishful-but it remains nevertheless precious, perhaps especially so in prison.
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The university must insist on teaching its own, immanent idea: the radical impulse should complicate the practice of teaching the incarcerated, but not betray it. Incarceration has no overriding purpose, much less an educational one. Prisons are total institutions and force upon their denizens a totalized experience, but not to any conscientious, rational end; the life they impose is hostile to thought. To borrow a phrase that John Taylor Gatto applies in Weapons of Mass Instruction to the scheduling practices of schools, prison is a "cauldron of broken time." 23 Constant noise, interruptions, scheduled movement periods, rules forbidding prisoners from possessing more than a small number of books and papers, and the press to fulfill the concrete necessities of everyday lifeall make nearly impossible the sustained concentration necessary for serious academic work. Imprisonment thus constitutes not the rehabilitative introduction of positive societal norms upon presumably deviant prisoners, but rather their induction into a pervasive, sordid prison subculture. Such a subculture produces its own unreflective, socially acquired disposition, what Pierre Bourdieu calls a habitus: a way of valuing, thinking, and feeling that reflexively determines what is worthy of respect, emulation, or admiration, and equally, what merits contempt, avoidance, or dismissal. A habitus hostile to learning is, in fact, prison's principal educational achievement.
The Schooling of Prison
What makes this habitus especially difficult to overcome is the drastically delimited prison vocabulary, which can all but foreclose reflection and imagination. Macho notions of manhood may require a certain deportment at odds with the scholarly, or even with mere intelligence. Mullen describes how free students internalize the gendered schema that classifies the sciences and mathematics as impersonal, objective, and hence acceptably masculine, while the arts and the humanities (except, perhaps, philosophy) are associated with feelings and subjectivity, and hence devalued as feminine. 24 In male prisons, that fatuous dichotomy may degrade thinking itself: since such qualities as sensitivity, the capacity for making fine distinctions, and the appreciation of intricacy, expressive subtlety, and elegance may be thought compromising, their cultivation-which is as essential to serious work in mathematics and the sciences as it is to the humanities-is neglected or even avoided. Manhood is also significant in another way: adult prisoners often lack the dissatisfaction and desire for self-development to which the young are susceptible, and in this, their chronological and developmental maturity can be as important as the prison habitus. The college idea requires that students regard themselves as not fully realized, but possessed instead of intellectual ambitions that they cannot attain on their own. Absent a measure of such feeling, students can hardly see education as anything but a means to obtain credentials. Although it would be a mistake to suggest that the anti-intellectual selfsatisfaction of the prison subculture is different from that of the larger culture of which it is part, it does pose an especially difficult problem in the generalized hopelessness of prison; for the lessons that prison inculcates include the futility of hope, the impossibility of justice, and the implausibility of genuine social and political change-lessons often enough laced with the derision of the prisoners' keepers. Under such conditions a slogan such as "freedom through education"-one of the mottos of my own program and not far from Epictetus-may seem overreaching.
Certainly, compulsory secondary education in prison does not obviously connect to freedom. Its solicitations take it for granted that money is the only motive for school. Granted, students would have to be remarkably idealistic to suppose there were other reasons, when what the state demands is the GED test battery, and what it offers afterwards are one-year vocational training certificates. In prison, the juridical equivalence of the GED to high school has resulted in the gutting of any curriculum that might prepare students for college or afford them any noninstrumental understanding of education. GED textbooks focus on what they call "skills" and '"strategies," and most students who obtain the diploma do so without ever reading a real book or writing more than 300 words at a time on the most basic of topics ("What would you do with a million dollars?"). Imposed as it is in large part by real constraints upon students-past failures in school, present bars and walls, a future living under the shadow of a felony conviction -the resultant culture of low expectations can be difficult to counter. Even were their prospects less dark, students burdened with so numbing a course of study should hardly be blamed for incuriosity. Morris Berman found the same phenomenon teaching in inner-city charter schools: "Care, attention, and ambition were foreign concepts because there was no meaningful social context for such notions to exist, and no consequent motivation." 25 The fact, then, that a teacher or tutor might be skilled and caring may mean no more than that students meet the marginal requirements of the GED test more quickly. In my own work as a GED tutor, facing old men near tears over their inability to reduce fractions reliably, attending to students interested in anything other than their test's prescriptions about topic sentences, or helping a long-suffering student get the ten more standardized points needed to pass, it is sometimes hard not to feel I am anything but a torturer, setting victims to arbitrary tasks in the service of the state. Jeremiah Bourgeois, a black colleague in the GED program who has spent 21 of his 35 years in prison on a life without parole sentence, is dispatched frequently to quiet or console students who happen also to be black. He acerbically uses the term "nigga pacifier" to describe his part in the scheme of things at such moments; they gall him especially because learning transformed him radically, from a fourteen year old with what psychologists might call conduct disorder to a distinguished undergraduate and writer.
Much of the time, I too am a sock puppet: an implement for cajoling recalcitrant prisoners to a modicum of compliance. Prison thus makes blatantly manifest what Jean Anyon describes as the "hidden curriculum" in public schooling. 26 It is bad enough that the system needlessly troubles many marginal students with academic tasks they hate. Of greater concern is the effect upon students who have talent and harbor hopes of attending college, whose minds need challenge and discipline. Some of them, despite the lack of incentives, do learn something; some get excellent scores (there have even been several perfect scores in the multiplechoice tests). Still, at a time when they retain the capacity to be moved and formed by what they read and study, their curriculum carefully guards them from everything worthwhile. It is not simply that the education leaves deficits-deficits might be easy enough to remedy. Rather, it trains them to be passive, dependent pupils with low expectations, pupils who confuse the memorization of arbitrary procedures with learning, pupils who cannot imagine that there might be anything of genuine interest to study. They absorb in a profound way the idea that there is nothing really worth learning for itself or for the person that it might make them. Bereft of intellectual curiosity or taste, they can hardly be blamed when the "College Education" lyrics they devise to perform at graduation insist, to the tune of Montel Jordan's "This Is How We Do It," that "With a degree, you will make lots of dough" and "If you wanna get a job, you gotta go to school. So he got an education. Now he's lookin' real cool. Now he owns his own home with a Cadillac. He's got good credit and his pockets are fat. So if you're hearin' what I'm sayin' just get up and go. Go get an education." They have learnt the lesson that the schooling of prison really teaches, and learnt it well. That it is meretricious is hardly their fault. Gatto asks, "Could Hegel himself have foreseen such an end to history, the planet as a universal schoolhouse where nothing much is learned?" 27 This is how they do it.
Towards Radical Learning in Prison
One might almost speak of a crisis of education.
T. S. Eliot, "Modern Education and the Classics" 28 Prison sets a darkling stage, then, for an odd clash-or rather, failure to clash-of radical teachers and students in higher education. Prison inculcates attitudes deeply antithetical to transformative learning, and prisoners are therefore especially prone to conform to what Eliot found to be the general rule: "if it is not going to mean more money, or more power over others, or a better social position, or at least a steady and respectable job, few people are going to take the trouble to acquire education. For deteriorate it as you may, education is still going to demand a good deal of drudgery." 29 Indeed, learning may even threaten the identity of those students who suppose ignorance preserves individuality and originality. Mostly, though, it is not that students deliberately reject the concept of learning for self-development: it is rather that they have never been exposed to such ideas of self and learning, for which prison affords no meaningful context. Radical teachers who teach for transformation of the world are liable to overlook these realities about the state of their students' minds, while even those teachers who are keen on value transformation risk mistaking just what values in their students most need transformation. Both may neglect the commitment involved in all understanding that students must have. The classroom then becomes a venue for the mere display of radicalism: in a parody of teaching, self-consciously radical teachers take the stage, striking positions that actively undermine the ideals necessary for learning, serving their desire to be radical, but failing quite radically to transform their students-to say nothing of society. The students negotiate the hoops, and, gratefully or bemusedly, pass on.
Such pedagogy no doubt feels virtuous: in prison perhaps more than anywhere, dealing as they are with students whose lives are exceptionally diminished, wellmeaning teachers naturally emphasize their egalitarian commitment to "dialogic" and "student-centered" education. But deference to the authority of experience easily becomes an evasion of complexity, especially in the humanities. These disciplines retain their necessary close concern for the quality of students' minds, and with what and how they think. As nearly the only universally required component of university education and as the discipline that most directly engages with students' reading, writing, and thinking, English may well be the exemplary discipline in this regard: certainly it affords the most scope for the radical impulse. Its curricular temptations are instructive. In an effort to cater to the presumably incorrigible need of imaginatively crippled students to identify with or relate to what they study, teachers may choose topics less for their intellectual value than for their putative suitability to what they expect typical prisoners to know or to feel interest in; likewise, they may pick texts less for the quality of their thought than for their lowbrow vernacular or purportedly empowering message. The result can be a curriculum that neglects to introduce students to the voices making up the privileged discourses from which they have been excluded, preferring instead current topics or the examination of oppression, never mind that, as one student put it at a meeting with faculty, prisoners already know, to surfeit, the seamier side of life.
Among the traps into which radical teachers can fall is the use of texts and modes of discourse that depreciate or betray the immanent rationale of the university's enterprise. The self-deprecating invitation to students to label their learning of more complex forms of discourse as merely the acquisition of an ability to "code-switch" endorses the notion that the codes are semantically equivalent and that what is being taught has principally the instrumental value of permitting communication with inexplicably fancy professors when, in fact, the idiolects of students are often not comparable in richness and subtlety to the codes that they hope to learn. From such mistaken premises matters take fire, fuelled by the tendency that teachers sometimes have to conflate real power with the academy or an amorphous "elite" that may even include, however absurdly, the dead authors of old books. 30 Some purportedly radical teachings trade on race essentialism to claim that what the university teaches does not really belong to people "of color." The result in each case is that students already inclined to believe that what the university teaches has no essential relation to their being find confirmation of the canard, and they are left with only the lure of a credential to get them through drudgery that only real interest could make meaningful.
At the root of the trouble is the desire of instructors to express their radical impulse by debunking and their tendency to forget that students in prison are much like college students anywhere in at least one regard: as Edmundson observes, "these students don't need debunking theories." 31 What they need rather more is a belief in accomplishment-of genius, even-and the possibility of making it their own: something that might impel them to cultivate curiosity, imagination, sensitivity, insight, and judgment as if everything depended on their possession of these qualities-which, after all, it in some sense does. Nietzsche insists, "the methods, one must say it ten times, are what is essential, also what is most difficult, also what is for the longest time opposed by habits and laziness." 32 Yet the methods that the university teaches cannot be learnt directly, as from a list, or by desultory engagements with topics of interest. They can only be gleaned from an intimacy with texts in which thinking happens and that constitute our modernity-texts in which style is inseparable from soul. If the university has any inherently radical theory, it is surely that students may be touched and transformed through encounters with attained grace. The process of building a modern mind, for prisoners as much as anyone, involves a vital shattering. In its insistence that students in their pursuit of the arts and sciences must direct attention and care to their thoughts and feelings, their ethics and aesthetics, in its connection of their passion and their prose into a unified field of deliberate cultivation, in its faith that this activity matters, learning can open up a space of radical possibility-but only if it has not already been foreclosed by the fashionable cynicism to which the world tends and to which radical teachers may themselves be inclined to drift. A university reduced to a means of "getting on"-something that Eliot accurately saw as "associated therefore with technical efficiency on the one hand, and with rising in society on the other"-can no more be radical than a rationalized number; and in prison, the university is always in danger of such reduction. 33 Radical teachers should be proud that the peculiar ethos their university defends is fragile, not especially practical, and altogether unpopular. Such a description will not, assuredly, pull in big checks. However they must now advertise themselves to the ignorant, in teaching teachers should embrace being sock-puppet apostles of another dispensation-an order of value in which, however tenuously, traces of human thought matter more than substantial monuments. Recognition of the parodic quality imposed upon university learning in prison should enable determination along with despair. Radical teaching that imparts to students some inkling of "a philosophical ethos that could be described as a permanent critique of our historical era" need not be impossible. 34 "Everything great is as difficult as it is rare," Spinoza writes, and if there is little hope that learning, in or out of prison, will be any easier or more widespread in the future than it is today, there nonetheless remains no substitute. 
